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Latest High Scope/Severity Citations
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Unsecured Emergency Exit Allows Repeated Elopement of High-Risk Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to keep an emergency exit door secured and alarmed, which allowed a cognitively impaired, exit-seeking resident at high fall risk to leave the building unsupervised on two consecutive nights. The resident had dementia with psychotic disturbance, severe cognitive impairment, a history of wandering and exit-seeking, orthostatic hypotension, gait abnormalities, and muscle weakness. Care plans and assessments identified wandering, exit seeking, fall risk, and insomnia, and interventions included a wander guard bracelet, frequent safety checks, environmental monitoring, and redirection from exits. Despite this, the resident routinely wandered at night, roamed the halls, entered other residents’ rooms, and was known by staff to push on the emergency exit door in attempts to leave. On the first night, in the early morning hours while it was still dark, the nurse noticed the resident was no longer in the hallway or in his room. The assigned NA, positioned near the west hall emergency exit, reported hearing a door slam but assumed it was a nearby resident’s room door because the emergency door alarm had not sounded. When the nurse checked the emergency exit, he found it unlocked and non-alarming, exited through it, and after walking several minutes from the back of the building to the front, located the resident standing at the main entrance. The resident’s wander bracelet triggered the main entrance door alarm when they re-entered, confirming the bracelet was in place. The nurse believed the emergency door locked and re-armed automatically and did not verify the lock or alarm status of the door after the incident or before the end of his shift, and no additional monitoring or new interventions were implemented at that time. On the second night, the same nurse observed the resident in bed at approximately 1:30 AM, but by about 2:00 AM the resident was again missing from his room. The nurse immediately went to the same west hall emergency exit and saw the resident outside through the door’s glass, walking away from the building. The door was again unlocked and did not alarm when opened. The nurse brought the resident back inside through that door and assessed him with no injuries noted. Staff interviews and maintenance inspection confirmed that the emergency exit door’s magnetic lock was controlled by a wall switch and the red alarm box on the door could only be turned on or off with a key; the system did not malfunction and could not be defeated by holding the push bar. This meant the door’s lock and alarm had been manually disabled by staff on at least one prior shift, and staff on subsequent shifts, including nurses and NAs who were aware of the resident’s exit-seeking behavior and the first elopement, did not verify that the door was secured and alarmed, allowing the resident to exit a second time without staff knowledge.
Failure to Respond to Pulse Oximetry Alarms for Tracheostomy-Dependent Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure that a resident requiring respiratory care and continuous pulse oximetry monitoring received services consistent with professional standards of practice and the resident’s care plan. The resident had spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, severe hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy, and chronic respiratory failure, was severely cognitively impaired, and was totally dependent on staff for all ADLs. The care plan and physician’s orders required mechanical ventilation with CPAP to tracheostomy collar overnight, humidified trach collar oxygen during the day, and maintenance of oxygen saturation above 92%, with pulse oximeter alarm parameters set to alert below 92%. The resident was equipped with a pulse oximeter linked to the Vocera alert system, which generated alarms at the bedside and on staff mobile devices when oxygen saturation fell outside ordered parameters. On the day of the incident, the resident’s oxygen saturation dropped to 84% at 8:58 AM, triggering an alert to the primary RN via the Patient Safe Solutions/Vocera system, followed by sequential escalation to the buddy RN, the charge RN, and the RT when not acknowledged. The Call Point Detailed Activity Report showed that an alert was sent to the primary RN at 8:58 AM, to the buddy RN at 8:59 AM, and to the charge RN and RT at 9:01 AM. The primary RN pressed “Accepted” on the device at 9:04 AM, and again when the system alerted at 9:17 AM and 9:18 AM, but did not go to the resident’s room to assess the resident and did not document any assessment or intervention. The buddy RN reported not recalling hearing the alert and stated they were administering medications and unaware of the resident’s distress until the rapid response was called. The charge RN acknowledged receiving the alert but did not respond timely, stating they expected the primary or buddy nurse to respond. The RT stated they received the alert but were busy with other residents and expected other staff to respond. From 8:58 AM to 9:23 AM, no assigned nurse or RT responded to the alarms or performed a clinical assessment of the resident, and the alarm cycle continued without intervention. At 9:23 AM, a second alert was triggered when the resident’s oxygen saturation dropped to 52%. An RN who was not assigned to the resident heard an alarm while passing the room, entered, and found the resident in a wheelchair, unresponsive with gray skin. This RN activated a rapid response/Code Blue, assisted in returning the resident to bed, and another RN began chest compressions. EMS was called and arrived at 9:44 AM; a pulse was briefly restored, and the resident was placed on a ventilator and transferred to the hospital, where they were determined to have no brain activity. Life support was later terminated and the resident expired. The facility’s own investigation concluded that nursing and respiratory staff failed to respond to alarms, failed to appropriately acknowledge and review alerts, failed to maintain accessibility to required communication devices, and failed to escalate when they were occupied or unable to respond, resulting in actual harm and Immediate Jeopardy to the resident and placing other monitored residents at risk.
Failure to Assess, Order, and Care Plan Bed Rail Use Resulting in Fatal Entrapment
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to follow its own policy and regulatory requirements for the assessment, ordering, care planning, and safe use of bed rails for a cognitively impaired resident. The resident was an elderly female with severe dementia, repeated falls, a fractured neck of the left femur, cognitive communication deficit, and a need for assistance with personal care. Her admission MDS showed a BIMS score of 03, indicating severe cognitive impairment, and documented that she required substantial staff assistance with bed mobility and was completely dependent on staff for transfers from bed to chair. Despite these needs, her care plan addressed ADL self-care performance deficits related to dementia and included interventions for bed mobility requiring one staff member to assist with repositioning, but it did not mention bed rails or any risk of entrapment. The facility obtained a bed rail consent form signed by the resident’s family member, which listed multiple potential dangers of bed rail use, including suffocation and various forms of entrapment that could cause injury or death. However, from the time of admission through the date of the incident, there was no documented bed rail safety or entrapment risk assessment for this resident, no physician order for bed rails, and no inclusion of bed rail use in the resident’s care plan. Maintenance staff reported that a charge nurse verbally requested installation of bed rails on the resident’s bed, and he believed the usual clinical steps—assessment, IDT review, consent, and physician order—had already been completed, but he had no documentation of when the rails were installed. The DON later confirmed that, for this resident, the required risk of entrapment assessment, physician order, and care plan focus for bed rails were not completed, and alternatives to bed rails were not attempted prior to installation, contrary to facility policy. On the night of the incident, a CNA observed the resident resting calmly around 2:00 a.m. During a subsequent round close to 5:00 a.m., the CNA found the resident partially out of bed with her head pinned between the assist bar/bed rail and the mattress, and notified the LVN. The LVN’s written statement described finding the resident seated on the floor on the right side of the bed, off the mattress, with her head resting between the side rail and the mattress, unresponsive. CPR was initiated and EMS was called, but the resident was later pronounced deceased. The county medical examiner reported that the resident had bruising and abrasions around the neck and jawline and hemorrhaging in the neck muscles, injuries consistent with being trapped between the mattress and bed rails, and indicated that the likely cause of death would be strangulation on the bed rails or asphyxiation on the mattress. Subsequent observation of the bed showed 1/3 bed rails of the same make and model as the bed frame and a low air loss mattress; while the rails were not loose and there was little space when the mattress was fully inflated, the air mattress could be compressed enough to create significant space between the mattress and rails. The facility’s failure to conduct a bed rail entrapment risk assessment, obtain a physician order, and incorporate bed rail use into the care plan prior to installation led to the resident’s entrapment and death, and constituted noncompliance identified as past Immediate Jeopardy. The facility’s written bed rail policy required that appropriate alternatives be attempted before installing bed rails, that the IDT assess each resident for entrapment risk, that risks and benefits be reviewed with the resident or representative, that informed consent be obtained prior to installation, and that manufacturer instructions and compatibility of bed, mattress, and rails be verified. It also required updating the care plan to reflect the need or choice for bed rails. In this case, staff interviews and record review showed that these steps were not followed for the resident involved. The DON acknowledged that the process did not occur as required, that the IDT did not meet to assess the resident for entrapment risk, and that the bed rails were installed based on the responsible party’s request without the mandated clinical review and documentation. This sequence of omissions and deviations from policy directly preceded the resident’s fatal entrapment between the bed rail and mattress.
Failure to Assess and Manage Pain During Wound Care for a Nonverbal Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide safe, appropriate pain management consistent with professional standards of practice and the resident’s needs during wound care. A female resident with severe cognitive impairment (BIMS score of 00) was admitted with multiple pressure-related skin conditions, including a left heel deep tissue injury (DTI), right heel DTI, an unstageable sacral pressure injury, a left heel ulcer, a right bunion DTI, and other bruising/discoloration. Her MDS Care Area Assessment did not trigger for pain and no care planning decision for pain was documented. The resident’s care plan contained detailed entries for her multiple wounds but did not include any care plan for pain, despite the presence of significant pressure injuries and ongoing wound care orders. Record review showed the resident had an active PRN order for acetaminophen 500 mg every 6 hours as needed for pain and an order for Doxycycline for the sacral wound, as well as twice-daily wound care orders for the unstageable sacral pressure injury. The MAR for the month showed that no acetaminophen had been administered since early in the month, even though wound care was being performed twice daily. During an observed attempt to perform wound care, the resident was dependent for mobility and required staff to roll and reposition her. When staff attempted to roll her for treatment, she winced, cried out "Oh my God" in Spanish, and displayed furrowed eyebrows and facial expressions consistent with pain. CNAs assisting with care noted that she appeared to be lying on the wound, that her wounds often drained, and that there was a foul odor and visible brownish-green drainage on her brief and positioning towels. Despite these signs, the treatment nurse could not confirm whether the resident had been assessed for pain or medicated prior to the procedure and was unsure of the resident’s primary language. During this same encounter, the resident was noted by the surveyor and CNAs to feel warm to the touch, and her wounds and dressings showed green, brown, or red drainage. The treatment nurse and CNAs acknowledged the resident felt warm, but the charge nurse (LVN) initially stated there was no indication the resident was in pain or needed vital signs assessed and only checked the resident’s temperature after being prompted by the surveyor. The LVN reported a normal temperature using a contactless thermometer, was unsure if the resident had any pain medication orders, and did not initially perform a direct pain assessment. Subsequent interviews revealed that the wound care NP had observed increased necrotic tissue and odor in the sacral wound the prior week and that the resident had been frequently combative, refusing wound care by kicking and biting, but this behavior had not been considered as a possible reaction to pain. CNAs later described the resident’s facial expressions and reactions during repositioning as indicating pain, while the LVN reported feeling pressured and nervous during the surveyor’s questioning and could not clearly describe having assessed the resident for pain during her shift. The resident’s responsible party stated they had not been informed of wound odor, infection concerns, or antibiotic orders and believed the resident was receiving pain and fever medications, later expressing shock upon reviewing video that showed wound care being attempted without medication. The facility’s own pain assessment and management policy stated that residents should be assessed for pain at admission and ongoing, monitored for pain with changes in condition, and that procedures such as moving or wound care can cause pain. It also directed that pain management interventions be consistent with the resident’s goals and documented in the care plan, and that underlying causes of pain, including skin/wound conditions like pressure ulcers, be addressed. In this case, the resident with multiple pressure injuries and ongoing wound care had no pain care plan, no documented pain assessment using appropriate tools for severe dementia, and no administration of ordered PRN pain medication in the weeks preceding the observed event, despite clear non-verbal signs of pain during wound care attempts. These actions and omissions led surveyors to determine that the facility failed to ensure pain was assessed and treated prior to wound care, resulting in the resident crying out and exhibiting pain behaviors when touched or moved.
Elopement of High-Risk Resident Through Disabled Stairwell Door Alarm
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide adequate supervision and maintain a safe environment for a resident with known exit-seeking behaviors and elopement risk. The resident had diagnoses of Parkinson’s disease, dementia with behavioral disturbances, and anxiety, and was assessed as having moderately impaired cognition. The resident’s MDS documented exit-seeking behaviors and daily use of a wander/elopement alarm, and the comprehensive care plan identified the resident as an elopement risk/wanderer related to disorientation to place, with an intervention for a wandering device on the ankle. A physician’s order also specified a wandering device to the right ankle with checks every shift. The 3rd floor North stairwell door alarm had been disabled by maintenance following a work order dated 07/02/2024. Maintenance and security staff attempted to address a wandering system alarm issue, and the alarm on the 3rd floor North stairwell door was turned off by removing a screw from the alarm box. A yellow plastic accordion-style barrier was placed in front of the door, and nursing staff were notified that the door was broken. However, the door itself remained accessible, and the alarm remained disabled for days prior to the elopement. Staff on the unit, including CNAs, were not all aware that the stairwell door was broken, and the door was not repaired until 07/17/2024. On the day of the incident, video footage showed the resident repeatedly exit-seeking at the 3rd floor North stairwell door over several hours. The resident moved the yellow barrier, wheeled around it, and closed it behind them. At one point, two unidentified staff observed the resident at the door, opened the barrier, and walked away without redirecting the resident. The footage documented multiple attempts by the resident to exit, including attempts to remove the wander alert bracelet and repeated efforts to push on the delayed egress bar with their leg and hands. Eventually, the resident stood from the wheelchair, pushed the crash bar, opened the door, and fell backwards into the stairwell while pulling the wheelchair through. The resident then maneuvered the wheelchair into the stairwell and exited the unit. Staff later discovered the resident missing, found the wheelchair in the stairwell, and the resident was ultimately located outside the building by a visitor and brought back inside by nursing and security. The DON’s investigation summary identified the root cause of the elopement as the 3rd floor North stairwell door alarm being disabled while the door remained broken and unsecured.
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