Making CMS Citations Actionable for LTC Providers

Penalty

No penalty information released

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide immediate and appropriate basic life support, including CPR, to a resident with a documented full code status when the resident was found unresponsive. The resident had diagnoses including a slow-progressing circulatory condition involving narrowing or blockage of vessels, a condition that restricts airflow and makes breathing difficult, and other listed conditions. The physician’s order specified “Full Code,” and the care plan documented that the resident was under court-ordered guardianship with wishes honored as full code. The facility’s policy required that in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest, staff immediately call for assistance, overhead page a code, begin CPR in the absence of a valid DNR, and continue CPR until EMS assumes responsibility or the resident responds. On the night of the incident at approximately 2:00–2:07 a.m., a CNA found the resident unresponsive in bed and notified the RN on duty. One CNA’s written statement indicated that the RN said she already knew the resident was going to die and instructed the CNA to clean and cover the resident. Another CNA’s account stated that the RN came to the room, took vital signs, and then instructed her to clean the resident. The RN’s own written statement and interview indicated that she called a code blue, that an LPN brought the crash cart, and that they performed CPR for approximately 20 minutes. The LPN’s statement corroborated that a code blue was called, that he brought the crash cart, and that CPR was performed for about 20 minutes before the RN stopped and stated that the resident was gone or words to that effect. The RN acknowledged that the resident had no vital signs but was warm and not responding, and she stated that she believed the resident was on hospice and therefore did not call 911. After CPR was discontinued, the RN did not activate EMS and instead notified the DON, the provider, and the resident’s family. The DON documented receiving a message from the RN that the resident had no pulse and no blood pressure and that the assigned nurse had initiated CPR but was unable to revive the resident. The DON later received a text from the RN that the resident had expired. The DON stated that at approximately 6:00 a.m. she called the facility and asked if 911 had been called, and upon learning it had not, she instructed the RN to call 911. The RN then reinitiated CPR at around 6:00 a.m., approximately four hours after the resident was first found without pulse or respirations, and stated that they tried to do something until EMS arrived because EMS had to see them doing CPR. EMS records showed activation at 6:18 a.m., arrival at 6:27 a.m., and pronouncement of death at 6:31 a.m., with documentation that CPR was not attempted by EMS because it was considered futile and that the resident exhibited postmortem changes. The Medical Director confirmed that the resident was full code and stated that staff should have started CPR and called 911 and that CPR should not be done four hours after a resident is pronounced dead. The facility’s investigation and a root cause analysis concluded that the RN and LPN did not follow the facility’s established policy and procedure to call 911 and administer CPR to a full code resident until EMS arrival. The root cause was identified as the nurse’s belief that the resident was on hospice and her failure to check the resident’s code status as outlined in facility policy. The surveyors determined that the failure to immediately activate EMS and to continue CPR until EMS arrival for this full code resident constituted noncompliance with the requirement to provide basic life support and resulted in an Immediate Jeopardy determination.

Plan Of Correction

This plan of correction is submitted as required under Federal and State regulations and statutes applicable to long term care providers. This plan of correction does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of the facility, and such liability is hereby specifically denied. The submission of this plan does not constitute agreement by the facility that the surveyors' findings or conclusions are accurate, that the findings constitute a deficiency, or that the scope or severity regarding any of these deficiencies cited are correctly applied. Resident #1 no longer resides in the facility as of 4.7.26. This has the potential to affect all residents in the facility. All codes to 1.1.26 were reviewed to ensure protocol was followed. No outliers were noted. All licensed nurses received education from the Director of Nursing and/or nursing management on [R] policy and procedure and Florida [R] policy. This includes where to find the code status. Education addressed what to do for full code hospice residents. Education completed with CNA's that protocol is that they do not assist with [R] or breaths during a [R] event. All education will be added to new hire orientation. Code drills will occur 3 x weekly x 4 weeks, followed by 2 x weekly x 4 weeks, followed by 1 x weekly x 4 weeks. Results will be brought to QAPI to determine need for ongoing auditing.

Removal Plan

• Educated licensed nurses on CPR policy and procedure and Florida Do Not Resuscitate (DNRO) policy, including where to find code status and what to do for full code hospice residents; emphasized initiating emergency services immediately when resident is full code, continuing CPR until EMS arrives, and that nurses cannot pronounce death or stop CPR on a full code resident unless instructed by EMS.
• Implemented emergency response “Code Blue” drills on all three shifts, including full code and full code hospice scenarios, with emphasis on calling 911 immediately.
• Educated licensed nurses and CNAs on the facility abuse and neglect policy, including resident rights.
• Required licensed nurses to complete a CPR post-test; restricted staff who have not completed education/testing from working until completion.
• Educated licensed nurses regarding change in condition.
• Placed laminated instructions on how to overhead page during a code at all nursing station phones and other designated phones.
• Held a Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review root cause analysis findings and approve recommendations.
• Held a Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review progress of the plan and approve recommendations.
• Completed a “like resident” audit of all expired residents and rehospitalizations for a defined period to determine whether involved staff were the same as the code event and whether proper procedure was followed.

Penalty

No penalty information released

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure that nursing staff possessed and demonstrated the competencies required to respond appropriately to a cardiopulmonary emergency for a resident with full code status. Resident #1, who was designated as full code, was found unresponsive and without respirations or pulse at approximately 2:07 a.m. Clinical staff, consisting of an RN (Staff A) and an LPN (Staff B), initiated CPR but did not activate Emergency Medical Services (EMS) as required by facility policy for a full code resident. After approximately 20 minutes of CPR, the RN and LPN stopped resuscitation efforts without EMS involvement. The RN, without authority to do so, pronounced the resident deceased based on the absence of vital signs and did not verify the resident’s code status before discontinuing CPR. The RN later stated she believed the resident was on hospice and therefore did not call 911, and that she was confused about which residents were hospice and which were full code. The LPN reported that he assumed the RN had called 911 and continued CPR for about 20 minutes until the RN “called the code” and left, and he acknowledged that he knew CPR should continue until EMS arrival but did not speak up. Four hours after CPR was stopped, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the RN restarted CPR and activated EMS after receiving instructions from the DON. The investigation further identified that the RN had no documented orientation, onboarding education, or skills competency assessments since hire, despite being promoted to weekend supervisor. Her BLS certification had been obtained through a fully online course without an instructor or live feedback. The LPN’s BLS certification was expired, and a CNA who performed several chest compressions also had an expired BLS certification, even though facility policy did not permit CNAs to perform CPR. Facility records showed that monthly code blue drills had been conducted, but there was no documentation that the RN had ever participated in these drills. Leadership interviews confirmed that required clinical orientation and competency evaluations had not been completed for the RN, and that she had failed tests for a clinical manager position but was nonetheless functioning in a supervisory role. These actions and omissions led surveyors to determine that staff were not adequately trained or competent to respond to cardiopulmonary arrest for residents with full code status, resulting in an Immediate Jeopardy determination. The facility’s own root cause analysis, as reflected in meeting minutes, identified that the nurse did not check the resident’s code status and lacked knowledge about when CPR could be discontinued and when 911 should be called. The analysis documented that the nurse believed the resident was hospice and therefore did not start or continue CPR appropriately or call EMS when the resident was found without respirations and pulse. The facility assessment tool and policies referenced the need for staff training and competencies in identifying changes in condition, end-of-life care, advance care planning, and adherence to the CPR policy, but the documented events showed that these expectations were not met in practice for the staff involved in this incident. Surveyors concluded that the failure to ensure nursing staff were trained and competent to respond appropriately to cardiopulmonary arrest for a full code resident, including immediate initiation and continuation of CPR and activation of EMS, constituted noncompliance with requirements for sufficient and competent nursing staff. The failure affected Resident #1 and placed other full code residents at risk, leading to an Immediate Jeopardy finding that was later reduced in scope and severity after verification of an acceptable Immediate Jeopardy removal plan.

Plan Of Correction

This plan of correction is submitted as required under Federal and State regulations and statutes applicable to long term care providers. This plan of correction does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of the facility, and such liability is hereby specifically denied. The submission of this plan does not constitute agreement by the facility that the surveyors' findings or conclusions are accurate, that the findings constitute a deficiency, or that the scope or severity regarding any of these deficiencies cited are correctly applied Resident # 1 no longer resides in the facility as of 4.7.26. This has the potential to affect all residents in the facility. All licensed nurses were audited to ensure current [R] certification. Facility will ensure [R] certification through a [R] provider whose training includes a [R] on session either in a physical or virtual instructor-led setting in accordance with accepted national standards. Human resources, or designee, will audit monthly to ensure all licensed nurses have a current [R] certification.Education was completed with licensed nurses on initiating [R] services immediately when a resident is full code. Education included that [R] is to continue on a full code resident until [R] arrives and that the nurse cannot pronounce [R] on the full code resident and/or stop [R] until instructed by [R].Education will be added to new hire orientation.7 random licensed nurses will complete a knowledge quiz related to code events. Per week x 4 weeks, followed by 5 nurses x 4 weeks, then 3 nurses x 4 weeks. Results will be brought to QAPI to determine need for ongoing auditing.

Removal Plan

• Regional Director of Clinical Services educated the Administrator and Director of Nursing regarding the CPR policy and the need to immediately contact emergency medical services (911) in the event of a full code; Administrator and DON signed the education
• Regional Director of Clinical Services provided documented education to the Administrator and Director of Nursing regarding the CPR policy and the need to immediately contact emergency medical services (911) in the event of a full code
• Director of Nursing and/or nursing management educated all licensed nurses on the CPR policy and procedure, including where to find code status and what to do for full code hospice residents
• Reinforced through education that CPR must be initiated immediately for full code residents, continued until EMS arrives, and that nurses cannot pronounce death or stop CPR on a full code resident unless instructed by EMS
• Conducted an Ad Hoc Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review root cause analysis recommendations related to the incident; recommendations approved
• Conducted a follow-up Ad Hoc Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review progress on the plan; recommendations approved

Penalty

No penalty information released

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The facility failed to maintain an environment as free from accident hazards as possible and did not provide adequate supervision to prevent accidents, particularly related to resident access to non-prescribed substances and implementation of fall-prevention measures. An anonymous resident reported that two female residents purchased cannabis gummies via DoorDash and offered them to another resident, who refused. These two residents were later sent to the hospital after one was noticeably impaired. Record review showed no investigation documented in the facility’s reportable or grievance logs regarding these residents’ changes in condition due to cannabis gummies being brought into the facility and offered to other residents. Nursing documentation for one of the involved residents described a change in condition with altered mental status, suspicion of substance abuse, and tachycardia, leading to transfer to the ER for evaluation and toxicology screening. A late-entry note indicated the resident was educated on facility policies prohibiting OTC medications and CBD products in the room. Another nursing note detailed that a CNA reported a resident had consumed a gummy given by another resident, then discarded the second gummy, which the CNA retrieved from the trash. On assessment, the resident was found lying in bed with reddened eyes, reporting feeling tired, and vital signs were obtained. The resident stated she had consumed “pot gummies” and allowed the nurse to inspect a wooden box at the bedside, which contained several red sugar-coated gummies, three vape pens (including a suspected CBD vape pen), a bottle of Benadryl, and several Imodium tablets. The resident reported purchasing the gummies and CBD vape pen from DoorDash, and the items were removed with her consent. Further documentation showed that another nurse was informed that two residents had consumed an unknown gummy-like substance. On assessment, one resident had very red eyes and reported feeling paranoid, with vital signs recorded. This resident stated she had received two gummies from another resident and that a third resident knew about the gummies. The nurse interviewed the third resident, who reported that the resident supplying the gummies had told her she had gummies and THC pens and planned to give gummies to another resident. The nurse also noted that as staff were going to check on the resident who supplied the gummies, a DoorDash delivery person arrived and handed a bag to the nurse containing a pack of cigarettes and a receipt showing two CBD purchases. Facility administration had no evidence that a thorough investigation into this incident had been completed, and only limited action was taken following the event, leading surveyors to identify an immediate jeopardy situation due to residents being susceptible to drug abuse from other residents. The facility also failed to address other accident hazards and fall-prevention interventions for additional residents. One resident, who had capacity to make her own medical decisions, was involved in an incident where she reportedly used a vape in her room while an oxygen concentrator was present and turned on. The resident was verbally educated by the Administrator about the dangers of vaping near oxygen equipment, the smoking policy requiring smoking paraphernalia to be stored by nursing staff, and the prohibition of vaping inside the facility. However, during the survey period it remained unknown whether the resident still had vape pens in her possession, and she refused a room search, leaving a possible serious fire hazard unresolved at the time of review. In separate observations related to fall prevention, one resident was observed lying in bed with a fall mat that was supposed to be in place on the floor instead leaned against the wall behind the headboard. Record review confirmed the care plan required fall mats on both sides of the bed while the resident was in bed, and an LPN acknowledged that the floor mat was not in place. Another resident, care planned as at risk for falls due to multiple factors including muscle weakness, cognitive impairment, incontinence, psychoactive medication use, recent hospitalizations, visual impairment, and a history of traumatic brain injury and multiple CVAs, was observed lying in bed with the bed not in the low position despite a care plan intervention specifying that the bed should be in the lowest position. A RN consultant confirmed that the bed was not in the lowest position while the resident was in bed.

Penalty

No penalty information released

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to implement physician orders for post-fall care, including hospital transfer and neurological monitoring, for residents on anticoagulant therapy. One resident with atrial fibrillation on Xarelto experienced an unwitnessed fall with a scalp laceration and head lump. The on-call provider, after a telehealth evaluation, ordered transfer to the ED and wrote an order directing that the resident be sent to the hospital. The resident was not transferred as ordered, and an additional order for vital signs and neuro checks every shift for 72 hours after the fall was not completed as ordered on one of the shifts. The LPN caring for this resident stated she did not send the resident to the ED because she had been instructed to call a supervisor before sending residents out, and she was unable to reach the supervisor during the shift. A second resident, also with atrial fibrillation and on Xarelto, had an unwitnessed fall with injury. The on-call provider was notified and ordered neuro checks every 15 minutes for one hour, every 30 minutes for one hour, hourly for four hours, then every four hours for an additional 24 hours. A physician’s order reflecting this schedule was scanned into the EMR. However, the neuro checks were not completed as ordered; instead, they were performed only once per shift for 72 hours. The RN who authored the progress note documented the fall and the resident’s anticoagulant use, and later stated she could not remember why she did not transcribe and complete the neuro checks as ordered. A third resident with atrial fibrillation on Apixaban had a non-injury fall after attempting to walk independently. The on-call provider ordered neuro checks every 15 minutes for one hour, every 30 minutes for one hour, hourly for four hours, and then every four hours for an additional 24 hours, and this order was scanned into the EMR. The record did not show that these neuro checks were completed as ordered; instead, neuro checks were documented only once per shift for 72 hours. The Medical Director stated he would have expected the first resident to be transferred to the ED as ordered and that the facility should not override a provider’s order. The DON acknowledged that the transfer order and the ordered monitoring for the first resident were not followed as written, and that for the second and third residents, staff performed only once-per-shift neuro checks instead of the more frequent monitoring ordered by the providers.

Penalty

No penalty information released

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and call emergency medical services for an unresponsive resident whose code status was unknown. The resident had been admitted with diagnoses including chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cirrhosis of the liver, hypertension, and dysphagia, and was documented as severely cognitively impaired and dependent on staff for several activities of daily living. The resident’s medical record did not contain any documentation of a code status, POLST, DNR order, or other advance directive limiting resuscitative efforts. In the early morning hours, a nurse entered the resident’s room to assist the roommate and observed that the resident was not breathing but was still warm to the touch. The nurse then obtained a second nurse to verify the absence of breathing. The facility’s final investigation report states that the nurse assessed the resident and noted absence of respirations, absence of a palpable pulse, and physical findings consistent with post-mortem changes, and determined the resident had expired. Despite the lack of any documented DNR or advance directive in the record available for review at that time, CPR was not initiated and 911 was not called. Interviews with staff confirmed that the resident’s code status was unknown at the time of the event and that no resuscitative efforts were made. The ADON stated that if a resident’s code status or POLST form cannot be found, the resident is considered a full code, and that when in doubt a resident is a full code. The DON reported that the LPN who found the resident did not know the code status and did not initiate CPR or call 911, even though the resident was a recent admission and no POLST form was on file. The LPN stated she suggested initiating CPR because there was no POLST, but the RN present told her not to start CPR. Other staff interviewed stated that if a resident’s code status is not known or cannot be found, CPR is supposed to be initiated.